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Abstract
The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development 
issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the 
names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those 
of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank and 
its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent.
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For years, South Korea presented the puzzling 
phenomenon of steeply rising sex ratios at birth despite 
rapid development, including in women’s education 
and formal employment. This paper shows that son 
preference decreased in response to development, but 
its manifestation continued until the mid-1990s due to 
improved sex-selection technology. The paper analyzes 
unusually rich survey data, and finds that the impact 
of development worked largely through triggering 
normative changes across the whole society — rather 
than just through changes in individuals as their socio-
economic circumstances changed. The findings show 
that nearly three-quarters of the decline in son preference 
This paper—a product of the Human Development and Public Services unit, Development Research Group—is part of 
a larger effort in the department to study social institutions and development outcomes. Policy Research Working Papers 
are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The corresponding author may be contacted at mdasgupta@
worldbank.org. 
between 1991 and 2003 is attributable to normative 
change, and the rest to increases in the proportions of 
urban and educated people. 
  South Korea is now the first Asian country to reverse the 
trend in rising sex ratios at birth. The paper discusses the 
cultural underpinnings of son preference in pre-industrial 
Korea, and how these were unraveled by industrialization 
and urbanization, while being buttressed by public 
policies upholding the patriarchal family system. Finally, 
the authors hypothesize that child sex ratios in China and 
India will decline well before they reach South Korean 
levels of development, since they have vigorous programs 
to accelerate normative change to reduce son preference.
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1.   Introduction 
Across East Asia and much of South Asia, child sex ratios have become more masculine in recent 
decades (Figure 1) — despite the region’s economic and social development, and many 
governments’ policy efforts to induce parents to value daughters more equally with sons.1  
Indeed, the only public policy that has demonstrably helped normalize national child sex ratios is 
in Mao’s China and North Korea — where an ideology of gender equality backed up by 
collectivization and control over private lives sharply reduced the scope for households to 
prioritize resource allocation among their members.2 More desirable ways of reducing son 
preference are needed.  
Until a few years ago, South Korea appeared to epitomize the pattern of rising sex ratios despite 
rapid development — with dramatic increases in levels of education, industrialization, and 
urbanization, as well as in women’s education and participation in the formal labor force (Table 
1). By the mid-1990s, South Korea was officially included as a member of the developed 
countries’ club, the OECD.  Yet sex ratios at birth rose steeply during this period (Figure 2).  
The sex ratio of the total population has not risen correspondingly, since female life expectancy at 
birth has risen more rapidly than male.3  
This flew in the face of over a century of social science theory.  Early theorists focused on the 
profound cultural and behavioral implications of the shift from pre-industrial to industrial 
economic organization.4  Essentially, this involved a shift from face-to-face communities bound 
by religious and other traditions, to more impersonal social groupings characterized by 
contractual associations. Accompanying this was a shift whereby people’s social status derived 
less from “ascription” based on characteristics such as their family of birth, and more from their 
individual achievements.  Later theorists argued that “modern” societies and individuals are 
motivated by the pursuit of innovation and rationality, rather than adherence to traditions.5  The 
Korean experience also challenged the idea that increases in women’s education and labor force 
participation reduces gender inequalities in intra-household allocation of resources.   
Since the mid-1990s, however, sex ratios at birth in South Korea have shown a steady decline, 
setting a new trend in Asia.  This raises some important questions, which we explore in this 
paper.  Firstly, what light does the South Korean experience shed on the complex issue of the 
relationship between “development” — a shorthand for the economic and socio-psychological 
changes summarized above — and son preference?  Secondly, what light does the South Korean 
case shed on likely trends in other countries such as China and India, and what policies might 
help reduce son preference there?  Or will they have to wait until they are as highly developed as 
South Korea before child sex ratios begin to normalize?  
To understand the relationship between development and son preference, it is important to clarify 
some points. Firstly, sociological theory indicates that economic development brings about 
normative and behavioral changes primarily at a societal rather than merely an individual level. 
Analysts of the diffusion of innovations have pointed out that new ideas are first adopted by those 
who are most exposed to new information, and then spread in a snowballing fashion through a 
population.6 Yet most analyses of son preference have focused heavily on correlating individuals’ 
characteristics with measures of their son preference, and therefore fail to capture the more 
important effects of underlying secular trends in a population. This may help explain why the 
literature shows mixed evidence that development mitigates son preference in Asia (Croll 2000).   
A second point that needs clarification is the distinction between the intensity of son preference 
felt by people, and its actual manifestation on the ground in sex ratios — which is what most 
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studies focus on.7  These two phenomena can sometimes move in opposite directions, as in 
South Korea during 1985-1995 (Table 2, Figures 2 and 3). This can happen when social norms 
regarding son preference are weakening, while new technologies become available which make it 
easier to manipulate the sex ratio at birth. The same applies if better technologies become 
available for assuring children’s survival after birth, since they can be used more assiduously for 
boys than for girls. Moreover, since educated women are typically better able to access and 
implement these new technologies, studies can even appear to suggest that gender outcomes for 
children are worsened by development, and even by improvements in the position of women.8   
In this paper, we use these two distinctions to inform our analysis of the relationship between 
development and son preference in South Korea.  Our analysis is made possible by the fact that 
South Korean fertility surveys actually ask women about their underlying son preference.  The 
usual practice in fertility surveys is to ask respondents about their preferred number and sex 
composition of children. The Korean surveys ask a very different question: they ask respondents 
whether they feel it is imperative to bear a son. This provides a measure of the underlying 
intensity of son preference. We analyze not only the individual-level characteristics correlated 
with this variable, but also the secular trends in this variable.  
We begin by describing the cultural underpinnings of son preference in South Korea: how these 
arose from centuries of social engineering designed to make Korea a strong authoritarian state, 
and how they have been re-shaped by development and by public policies since the 1950s. This is 
followed by an analysis of the National Fertility and Family Health Surveys conducted in 1991 
and 2003 in South Korea.  Throughout our analysis, we use the term “son preference” to refer to 
the underlying son preference, and not its manifestation.  
Briefly, our analysis indicates that development has altered son preference primarily through 
setting in motion changes at the societal ⎯ rather than the individual ⎯ level. Son preference is 
as expected inversely related to individual socio-economic status, but our decomposition analysis 
shows that the overwhelming factor underlying the reduction in son preference is a secular trend 
of changing social norms cutting across all socio-economic groups. We argue that son preference 
declined in South Korea primarily as a result of ideational change triggered by changes in 
underlying social and economic conditions, analogous to the discussion in the demographic 
literature of the role of ideational change in altering fertility behavior.9 Interestingly, this has 
happened despite strenuous efforts by the government until recently, to maintain traditional 
family and gender relations, through legislation and other policies. 
 
2.   Factors underlying son preference and forces of change 
The roots of son preference in Korea 
The patriarchal family system that underlies son preference in Korea was introduced through a 
process of rigorous social engineering during the early-mid Choson dynasty (1392-1910).   It 
replaced a much more bilateral family system, in which a couple might live with either the 
woman’s or the man’s family, and male and female offspring could both inherit their parent’s 
property (Deuchler 1992:80-81).   
Deuchler (1992, 2003) gives a detailed description of this transformation of the dominant kinship 
system in Korea.  It was central to a Confucian strategy of building a strong authoritarian state, 
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borrowing heavily from readings of Chinese texts.  The Confucians set out to obliterate 
Buddhism, with its emphasis of individual self-realization and salvation, which they felt detracted 
from loyalty to the family and state.  They sought to replace this with a tightly structured system 
of kinship and political relations designed to promote stability and loyalty to a series of nested 
corporate groups — the household, the lineage, the state — underpinned by prescribed rituals.  
The core of this system was a rigidly patrilineal kinship system, which specified in extensive 
detail the roles and status of each member of a household and lineage, under the unchallenged 
authority of the (male) head of the family. These authoritarian kinship relationships were 
mirrored through the political hierarchy, culminating in obeisance to the king.   
“Neo-Confucianism not only masculinized the public sphere…, but also established the 
family as the proto-typical metaphor of social relations among individuals and groups” 
(Moon 2002: 478). 
 “Social organization was tied together by a threefold mechanism: the domestic sphere, 
represented by the wife, was subordinated to the public sphere, represented by the father 
and son, they in turn were the sovereign’s subjects”.” (Deuchler 1992:111). 
Ancestor worship was strenuously promoted, as a means of strengthening corporate bonds within 
the family and lineage (Deuchler 1992:133).  This ensured that people were engaged not merely 
in assuring the welfare of their current family members, but that they sought to assure the well-
being of previous generations of ancestors through specified ritual practices, as well as by bearing 
sons to ensure that the corporate group would endure over generations. Over several centuries, the 
neo-Confucians and the Department of Rites refined the details of this patriarchal authoritarian 
regime, and fought relentlessly against the survival of traces of the old bilateral system of kinship.  
Strong supernatural sanctions ensured conformity to the Confucian rules.  Kendall (1984) 
describes beliefs in ancestors and ghosts in rural Korea in the 1980s, and spells out how they 
served to generate a great deal of pressure to conform to the needs of the corporate group.10  
Ancestors who bore sons, and are cared for by their agnatic (male-line) descendants can be a 
benign influence on their family.  But even these can be restless and dangerous if they died with 
unfulfilled desires, such as seeing their grandsons.   Those who died unmarried or without male 
descendants are filled with resentment and can create all kinds of problems for their siblings and 
other kin.  It is apparent that there is much pressure from a wide range of family members to 
ensure that each individual performs their filial duties of marrying and bearing sons quickly, and 
caring for their ancestors. 
This was a highly ascriptive system.  Access to political power, as well as the economic and 
social assets of the lineage, was regulated through one’s position in the lineage.  Appointments to 
government office depended on passing examinations, but candidates were only eligible to sit the 
examinations if they had the right position in a noble yangban lineage. 11    State sanctions 
reinforced lineage rules: for example, the sons and grandsons of widows who defied the ban on 
widow re-marriage were not allowed to take the civil service examinations. 
Lineages formed part of larger superordinate lineages of increasing size and generational depth, 
which are sometimes referred to as “clans” in Korea.12  Many villages had a dominant lineage, to 
which the majority of men belonged.  It was common for lineages to hold some joint property, 
which was used to support ancestor worship rituals, and to help lineage members in need.  
Lineage members interacted frequently in the context of daily life and specified rituals, and 
offered a source of mutual support and mutual supervision: “the p'a (lineage) performed many of 
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the social services on the local level that are now provided by public schools, police, and social 
welfare agencies” (US 1990, parentheses ours).  
Lineage membership thus determined much of a person’s life chances.  Genealogies were 
carefully maintained, showing the exact nature of each (male) member’s relationship with the 
lineage.  The lineage was continued through the line of the eldest son in each generation, and 
other sons in each generation would start their own sub-lineages.  This meant that the eldest son 
had the burden of caring for all the male ancestors, and it was especially important for him to bear 
a son to continue the family line (male descent line).   
Women were severely marginalized by these strict rules of patrilineal kinship and inheritance 
which placed the father-son duo in the public sphere and relegated women to the domestic sphere.  
Strict rules of lineage exogamy meant that wives would be outsiders in their husband’s village: as 
a result, women were socially isolated whereas men were surrounded by networks of social 
support.  At marriage, a woman and her unborn children would be formally transferred to her 
husband’s family: so only sons could care for their parents in this life and in their afterlives.  A 
woman’s primary duty was to bear sons to ensure the continuity of her husband’s lineage.    
State policies reinforcing patriarchy, since the 1950s   
Between the 1950s and the establishment of democracy in 1987, the Korean state sought to 
reinforce Confucian traditions in order to maintain social and political stability under a series of 
authoritarian governments. The rules of patrilineal social organization were formally legalized 
into the Korean Civil Code in 1958, in provisions also referred to as the Family Law.  Inter alia, 
these stipulated that family headship must be held by the men in the line of the eldest son, that 
inheritance should be through the male line, that men must marry outside their lineage, that 
women should be transferred to their husband’s family register upon marriage, and that the 
children belong to the father’s lineage even in the case of divorce.  
From the 1960s onwards, successive governments in Korea used their authoritarian powers to 
effect rapid economic development through a series of highly directed initiatives.  Promoting the 
traditional principles of loyalty to the ruler and filial piety, they freed themselves to a large extent 
from the need to cater to competing constituencies.  There was active repression of citizen 
demands for democracy, and of trade union activity not approved by the military regimes, and 
calls for greater gender equity were largely ignored (Moon 2002).   
This suppression of competing constituencies made it possible to channel national resources 
towards rapid industrialization.  Wages were kept low, to permit high levels of investment in 
industrial growth, and to keep Korean exports competitively priced.  For similar reasons, state 
expenditures on social welfare were curtailed.  As late as 1989, when the country was just a few 
years away from becoming a member of the OECD, the government emphasized that families 
would continue to be primarily responsible for social welfare (Moon 2002:483). The state 
encourages people to support their parents through a variety of measures, including tax breaks, 
housing loans, filial piety awards, and the annual observance of an “Old Age Day” (Prendergast 
2005). This means, of course, that women would continue to bear the burden of caring for the 
young, the old, the sick, and the disabled.   
To use women most effectively for national development, women were hired in the labor force 
but expected to leave work when they married, and return to part-time work once their 
households needed them less.  They have contributed heavily to the labor force in low-paid jobs 
in factories and offices.  More recently, there has been a trend of greater employment of women 
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in professional positions, and towards women remaining in the labor market after marriage.13  
Women’s organizations were established by the state as part of national development drives.  For 
example, the New Village Women’s Association and Mothers’ Clubs were established to 
implement state policies of population control and economic development, as well as inculcating 
political loyalty.14  There were some spontaneous women’s movements, which pressed for 
greater gender equity, and especially for reforms of the Family Law.  However, these had limited 
success until after the establishment of democracy in 1987.  In 1990 the Family Law underwent 
some major reforms, but as noted above the government was at that time still highly committed to 
maintaining traditional family roles.15  Therefore the system of male family headship was 
retained, leaving women relegated to secondary position. 
However, citizens came increasingly to question the relevance of these traditions for organizing 
their present-day lives.  The women’s movement gained momentum along with the success of 
civil society movements demanding an end to military rule, and was successful in obtaining court 
judgments challenging the constitutional validity of key aspects of the Family Law.16  Individual 
petitioners were also successful: for example, in 1997 the Constitutional Court of Korea ruled it 
unconstitutional to prohibit marriage within the lineage.  In 2005, the Supreme Court ruled that 
women could remain members of their natal household after marriage, and that women and men 
have equal rights and responsibilities to care for their ancestors (Kim 2005).  Eventually in 2005, 
the government abolished male family headship and allow parents who so wished to register their 
children under the mother’s family name with effect from 2008.   
Forces of change: the role of industrialization and urbanization 
Industrialization and urbanization break the stranglehold of the lineage and family on the 
individual through many channels.  As described above, in pre-industrial Korea a person’s 
access to power, social status, and economic opportunities depended heavily on their gender, 
lineage, and even their position within that lineage.  With the advent of industrialization, 
increasing proportions of the population became able to earn a living independent of their 
position in the family, through jobs which they could acquire purely on the basis of their personal 
skills and qualifications. Increasing proportions of people also obtained formal education, which 
further reduced their dependence on the family and also exposed them to new ways of thinking.  
Another factor is that growing proportions of the population have retirement savings for their old 
age.17 As a result, people have become less dependent on financial support from their children. 
However, this does not reduce the need for sons to support them in their afterlife, as no earthly 
savings can take care of this need.    
The organization of urban life also differs enormously from that of rural life, reducing the 
centrality of sons in their parents’ lives.  To begin with, the lineage is much less omnipresent in 
urban life. While villagers spend their daily lives surrounded by members of their lineage and 
community, urban residents live and work in the more diverse and impersonal settings of 
apartment blocks and office complexes.  This reduces pressures to conform to traditional 
expectations of filial duty.  Access to social support networks also changes: in rural areas 
women are isolated while men are surrounded by kin, but this does not hold in urban areas.  In 
fact, churches and temples form a core part of urban social networks in South Korea today, and 
women are the main players in this.18  
The greater physical mobility associated with non-agrarian life means that sons may no longer be 
near their parents to help care for them.  And married daughters may live near their parents, 
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unlike rural areas where lineage exogamy is typically synonymous with village exogamy. 
Whether urban parents derive support from a child comes to depend less on formal rules based on 
the gender and birth order of the child, and more on who lives in the same city and the strength of 
the parent-child relationship. This reduces the gap between the value of daughters and sons to 
their parents.19  And female education and employment further enhances the potential value of 
daughters, especially when they are not completely cut off from their parents as in rural areas.  
The conditions of urban life also make it easier for parents to implement greater gender equity in 
inheritance.  Customary rules of inheritance are the most inflexible regarding immovable lineage 
assets such as land: giving these to a daughter would involve the deeply radical action of passing 
land out of the lineage.  Efforts in China and India to encourage equal inheritance of land met 
with violent resistance.20  It is far easier to give daughters a share of savings and assets acquired 
on one’s own in non-farm occupations.  It is also far easier for women to demand their rightful 
inheritance in urban areas, where legal resources are close at hand — in contrast to rural areas, 
where such amenities are distant and instead the woman is surrounded by entire male lineages 
hostile to her intent.   
Decades of cumulative social change associated with the above trends seem to have relaxed the 
pressure to bear sons.  As discussed below, the felt need to have sons has declined sharply across 
all age-groups and socio-economic groups in the population. These changes are illustrated by one 
woman’s story of her own family, recounted in 1996 before it was apparent that the trend of sex 
ratios at birth was reversing:21
“My eldest brother took a concubine and had a son with her because his own wife had 
not borne a son. My husband's parents disinherited their eldest son because he did not 
have a son, and gave their property to the second son: he never forgave his wife for not 
having a son.  But my husband's youngest sister was supported by her husband 
although she had only daughters, even though his parents were terribly angry since they 
had adopted him in order to carry on their family.  A few young couples now are able 
to bear the pressure of not having a son.”  
Interestingly, the national survey questionnaires also reflect these changes in social norms.  In 
1991, women were asked how many brothers their husband had, and his birth order amongst his 
brothers. But in 2003, they were asked how many brothers and sisters their husband had, and his 
birth order amongst them.  The social science literature on South Korea includes much 
discussion of the shift in women’s position.22  
 
3.   Data and Methods  
We analyze the data collected in the Korea National Fertility and Family Health Surveys of 1991 
and 2003, which were conducted by the Korea Ministry of Health and Welfare in cooperation 
with the Korea Institute for Health and Social Affairs. These are nationally representative sample 
surveys, using the preceding census for their sampling frame. The 1991 survey is the oldest 
nationally representative fertility survey in South Korea for which the raw data are still available, 
and the 2003 survey is the most recent one conducted. The sampling method and contents of the 
survey are described in detail in Korea Institute for Health and Social Affairs, (1992, 2004).  
In both surveys, all women in the sample who were aged 15-49 and ever-married at the time of 
the survey were interviewed, and a range of data collected on their fertility history, attitudes to 
family-building, and background characteristics of the woman and her husband.  The sample size 
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was around 7,000 and 6,500 women in 1991 and 2003, respectively. 
Variables 
Our dependent variable is whether or not the woman stated that it was imperative to have a son 
(“must have a son”).  As Table 3 shows, this variable is clearly related to women’s actual 
childbearing decisions: those who reported strong son preference were far more likely than the 
others to manipulate their sex ratios at birth if they had not yet borne a son.   
Our independent variables include a range of socio-economic characteristics of the woman and 
her husband.  These have been shown in previous studies to be related to fertility attitudes and 
behaviors, and therefore we hypothesize that they are similarly related to the strength of son 
preference.  The educational level of the woman and her husband is hypothesized to be inversely 
related to son preference, as is their employment status, especially in white-collar jobs which 
imply a higher social status.  Rural residence is hypothesized to be associated with greater 
pressure to conform to traditional views on the need to bear sons, and residence in a metropolis to 
be associated with weaker son preference than residence in a small city.  In addition, the 1991 
survey asked about where respondents and their husbands had lived for the longest period before 
marriage, and we hypothesize that this will be similarly related to son preference as current 
residence.  We also hypothesize that since traditional attitudes have been weakening over time, a 
woman’s age will be inversely related to her son preference.  
Additionally, we hypothesize that there is a secular trend in the intensity of son preference 
between 1991 and 2003 which cannot be explained by the other independent variables in our 
model. To test this hypothesis, we include for a pooled sample of the 1991 and 2003 surveys, a 
dummy for the year of survey (with a value of 1 if the respondent was interviewed in 2003 and 0 
if it was in 1991).  
A number of variables capture the extent to which women and their husbands are subject to 
familial pressure, which might be expected to be associated with stronger son preference.  The 
extent of parental pressure to have sons is captured by whether the husband is the only son.  As 
described above, the filial duty to have a son is especially strong if the husband is the only son, 
and therefore the only person who can assure the continuity of the lineage.  Ideally, we would 
have analyzed this effect for the eldest son, who is traditionally the one designated to continue the 
lineage, but this information is not available in the 2003 survey.  Similarly, if the couple lives in 
a joint family ⎯ typically with the husband’s parents, though this is not specified ⎯ we would 
expect the woman to be subject to greater pressure to have a son.  
Women who indicate lower conformity to tradition in their marriage decisions by marrying at an 
older age are hypothesized to have lower son preference.  In addition, the 1991 survey collected 
information on whether the parents decided the marriage, and we hypothesize that this will be 
associated with stronger son preference.    
The 1991 survey also asked the woman’s and her husband’s religion. We hypothesize that those 
who report that they are “Buddhists” will have higher son preference than others, as has been 
found elsewhere.23  Very few people report their religion as Confucian, since Confucianism is 
viewed more as a part of the culture, not a religion as such, but Confucian values are pervasive 
across the population regardless of religious affiliation.24 They are strongest amongst those who 
report themselves to be “Buddhist” — who are concentrated most in the Eastern region, which 
also manifests the most conservative Confucian values.25  After centuries of suppression of 
traditional Buddhist tenets, the term “Buddhist” has come to be largely synonymous with stronger 
 7
adherence to Confucian family traditions and Korean folk religions26 ⎯ as compared with 
Christians, whose religion has some strong roots outside of Korean traditions.  
Methods 
Our analysis has four steps. First, we examined the relationship between women’s characteristics 
and their reported son preference in 1991 and 2003, using frequencies and chi-square tests 
(results not shown).  Second, we used multivariate logistic regression analyses to estimate the 
odds ratio for the association between a respondent’s characteristics and having strong son 
preference, while adjusting for all the other characteristics in the model. This was done separately 
for 1991 and 2003 using the same variables for easy comparison, and a third regression was run 
including the variables available only for 1991, as well as a fourth regression used the pooled data 
from both the 1991 and 2003 surveys (Table 4).  Third, we examined changes between the two 
survey years in the probability of reporting intense son preference, within a given subgroup of 
women.  This was done by merging the 1991 and 2003 datasets, and conducting univariate 
logistic regression analyses for each selected characteristic of women (Table 5).  
Fourth, we decomposed the contribution of two factors to the decline in the intensity of son 
preference between 1991 and 2003: changes in population composition and changes in social 
norms (Table 6).  The first is the contribution attributable to increases in education and 
urbanization (“population composition”).  This we estimate by holding the levels of son 
preference constant at those reported by specific education and urbanization categories of women 
in 1991, and increasing the proportions educated and living in urban areas from their 1991 levels 
to their 2003 levels.  The second is the contribution of changes in social norms. This we estimate 
by holding the population composition constant at their 2003 levels, and changing the level of son 
preference of each socio-economic category of women from their 1991 levels to their 2003 levels. 
We also estimated the independent contribution of each of the variables in the model. The 
decomposition methodology used is described in the Appendix. 
To assess the robustness of our estimates of the contribution of each independent covariate, we 
also did the decomposition without the constant term (results not shown).27 A rationale for this is 
to make the estimates for the independent contribution of each of the variables in the model more 
directly comparable, since the constant term refers to an underlying shift and is therefore 
applicable only to the part associated with changes in ideas of son preference.   
 
4.   Trends in son preference 
Trends in the manifestation of son preference: 
Figure 2 shows the trends in the sex ratio at birth, and the trend in the Total Fertility Rate.  
Fertility levels declined rapidly between 1970 and 1985. The sex ratio at birth was high during 
the 1970s, even before the advent of sex-selective technology. This may reflect female infanticide 
at birth, and not reporting the child as a live birth. Sex-selective technology became widely 
available by the mid-1980s, and the sex ratio at birth rose sharply until the mid-1990s (Figure 2).  
Since then it has been declining, but is still well above normal and South Korea remains second 
only to China in the masculinity of its sex ratio at birth.   
It is striking that the sex ratio at birth fell while the Total Fertility Rate plummeted to just above 1 
child per woman. Rapid reduction in fertility tends to increase pressure not to have girls ⎯ as the 
 8
total number of children that people want falls, leaving less space for tolerating daughters.  
There is some evidence of this in the disaggregated data: for example, sex ratios at birth rise 
sharply with parity in Table 3, especially amongst women who have not borne a son.28   
Figure 2 shows another interesting feature. There are sharp annual fluctuations in the sex ratio at 
birth which is related to the cycle of animal years: fewer girls were born in the animal years 
deemed to be associated with personality characteristics which would not make for good wives.29 
These annual fluctuations are much smaller after the mid-1990s, suggesting that as people 
abandoned their traditional beliefs about the place of men in the universe, they also abandoned 
their beliefs about personality characteristics associated with animal years.  
Trends in underlying son preference: 
Women’s reported underlying son preference has been declining sharply over time. Table 2 shows 
a steady decline between birth cohorts in the percentage reporting that they “must have a son”. 
Two-thirds of the oldest women interviewed in 1991 stated that they “must have a son”, and this 
fell to below 30 percent amongst the youngest women interviewed in 1991.  
Figure 3 shows the proportion of women in successive surveys who reported that they “must have 
a son” fell slowly between 1985 and 1991, and then precipitately.  Clearly the decline in 
underlying son preference was snowballing through the population.  As mentioned above, this 
reported intensity of son preference is clearly associated with actual family-building behavior 
(Table 3).  
The most striking evidence of a secular decline in son preference is the fact that women with 
similar individual characteristics showed lower son preference in 2003 than in 1991 (Table 5). 
Comparing the responses obtained from women of the same birth cohort in 1991 and 2003 shows 
that, in each birth cohort, there was an approximate halving of the proportions reporting strong 
son preference over this 12-year period (Table 2).  For example, 35 percent of women born in 
1955-64 said that they “must have a son” when interviewed in 1991, but only 19 percent of them 
were still of this view in 2003.  This secular trend in son preference is analogous to that shown 
in responses about family size preferences in India, where it is not uncommon for older women to 
say “In my day we reproduced like animals, but things have changed and I have told my 
daughter-in-law to get sterilized after two children”.  
 
5.  Correlates of son preference: Odds of stating “must have a son”   
Summary statistics: univariate analysis  
The univariate analysis of the socio-economic characteristics that we hypothesize to be associated 
with son preference show associations in the expected directions (results not shown). This 
includes the woman’s and her husband’s education, occupation, urban/rural residence, and 
religion; whether the husband is the only son of his parents; whether the couple live with their 
parents; whether the parents decided the marriage; and the woman’s birth cohort and age at 
marriage.  All these variables show significant differences in the expected directions, in both the 
1991 and 2003 surveys — son preference declines with increasing socio-economic status, lower 
parental control, younger birth cohort, and older age at marriage.  “Buddhists” show 
significantly higher son preference, as do women whose husbands are the only son, couples who 
live with their parents, and those whose marriages were decided by their parents.  And where 
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both variables are available for both survey years, there is a significant decline during 1991-2003 
in the son preference associated with each variable.     
Multivariate analysis  
The results of the multivariate logistic regressions are shown in Table 4.  These show the odds 
ratios of women stating strong son preference, relative to the base category within each variable. 
We ran models with the same variables for the 1991 and 2003 surveys, to facilitate comparison of 
the results from the two surveys (Table 4, cols 1 and 2). We also ran a model using the pooled 
sample of women in both surveys, to test whether there is a secular trend in son preference 
between 1991 and 2003, independent of the other variables in our model (Table 4, col 3).   
In addition to this, we ran a separate regression for the 1991 survey which added variables that 
were unavailable in the 2003 survey (results not shown). The addition of these variables changes 
little in the results, except for muting the effect of women’s education.  Here we report the 
results of this model only for these additional variables.  
Education and occupation:  The data indicate that higher levels of women’s education are 
associated with lower son preference, and that the odds of strong son preference decline more 
sharply with increasing education in the 2003 survey than in the 1991 survey.  The association is 
much weaker for husband’s education in 1991, and not significant in 2003.  Women with white 
collar jobs showed significantly lower odds of strong son preference in 1991, but not in 2003. 
Husband’s occupation does not show a significant association. 
Rural / urban residence:  Living in urban areas is significantly associated with lower son 
preference, and the effect is even sharper for metropolises than for small cities.  This is true for 
both 1991 and 2003, but the differences are sharper in 1991 --- implying that differentials by 
residence became less sharp by 2003.  Information on previous residence is available only for 
1991, and shows significant negative association only for women’s previous residence, not that of 
their husbands. 
Religion:  Being “Buddhist” is strongly associated with higher son preference in the case of 
women.  As discussed above, traditional Buddhism was effectively suppressed in Korea, and 
people who report themselves to be “Buddhist” today are amongst the most conservative 
adherents of Confucian values.  The association is not significant in the case of their husbands.  
Unfortunately, these data are not available for 2003. 
Parental pressure:  If the husband is his parents’ only son ⎯ and therefore the only source of a 
continued line of male descendants ⎯ there is a significantly higher likelihood of the woman 
reporting that she “must have a son.” Interestingly, this association intensifies between the 1991 
and 2003 surveys.  Living with parents shows a significant positive association with son 
preference only in the 1991 survey.  Although our data do not throw light on why this shift has 
taken place, one possible reason may be related to the popular perception that the children now 
seek to live with their parents in order to obtain help with childcare, rather than the traditional 
expectation of supporting aging parents.30  
Women’s autonomy in marriage:  In 1991, older age at marriage was associated with lower 
son preference.  This relationship is almost non-existent in 2003.  The data (available from 
only the 1991 survey) on whether the parents decided on the marriage indicate that women with 
arranged marriages were more likely to show traditional values of son preference. 
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Woman’s birth cohort:  The younger the woman, the lower the son preference in both 1991 
and 2003.  This confirms the trend found in reported son preference in Table 2, and shows that 
the trend remains significant even after controlling for many socio-economic, and cultural factors 
associated with son preference. 
Secular trend 1991-2003:  From the model with the pooled sample of women in the 1991 and 
2003 surveys, we found a strikingly large and significant secular trend between 1991 and 2003.  
Controlling for all the above independent variables, the odds ratio of stating “must have a son” 
was only 0.34 in 2003 as compared with 1991.   
 
6.  Why is son preference declining? A decomposition analysis 
We now turn to analyzing the relationship between Korea’s socio-economic development (as 
measured by education and urbanization), and the decline in reported son preference between 
1991 and 2003.  To do this, we decompose the respective contributions of (a) changes between 
1991 and 2003 in “population composition”, i.e. the proportions of the population who are 
educated or living in urban areas ⎯ holding each group’s intensity of son preference constant at 
1991 levels; and (b) change in “social norms” between 1991 and 2003, i.e. lower level of son 
preference within a given education or urban/rural residence group ⎯ holding the population 
composition constant at their 2003 levels.  
There have been rapid changes in “population composition”, as well as in “social norms” during 
this period. Table 1 shows the dramatic increases in levels of education and urbanization in South 
Korea.  Table 5 shows the sharp decline between 1991 and 2003 in the odds ratio of stating 
“must have a son”: in 2003, it is roughly one-third of its 1991 level within any given category of 
education and urban/rural residence.  The exception to this is in rural areas, where the odds ratio 
dropped to less than one-fifth its 1991 level.  This is especially notable because it implies rapid 
diffusion of new norms to rural areas, and consequent homogenization between rural and urban 
areas.     
The results of the decomposition are shown in Table 6, and show the contribution of each variable 
to the overall decline in the probability of stating “must have a son” over the period 1991-2003, 
other things equal.  The most striking result is that change in social norms accounts for as much 
as 73 percent of this decline, and only 27 percent of the decline is accounted for by changes in 
population composition (increases in education and urbanization).  This is consistent with the 
findings in Table 2, which shows that son preference declined with birth cohort, and also that 
women of the same birth cohorts were far less likely to report strong son preference in 2003 
compared with 1991.  It is also consistent with Table 5, which shows similar declines in son 
preference across all education and urban/rural groups ⎯ except among rural residents, who 
actually showed a steeper decline in son preference than urban residents. 
That there was widespread change in social norms across the entire population between 1991 and 
2003 is indicated by the fact that the estimate of the constant term is significant, positive and very 
large.  The inclusion of the constant term renders the association between son preference and 
education insignificant, and urban residence becomes associated with increased son preference 
(see also Table 5).  When the constant term is eliminated (results not shown), husband’s 
education and urban residence become significantly associated with lower son preference. 
However, the overall results are fairly similar across the two models: changes in social norms 
account for 73% of the total change with constant term, and 81% without it.  
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Turning to the contribution of changes in “population composition” to the decline in son 
preference between 1991 and 2003, we find that increases in women’s education contributed as 
much as 19 percent of the total decline, particularly the increases in the proportions of women in 
the highest education group. Changes in husbands’ education levels have a more mixed and 
muted effect. Another 11 percent of the decline is contributed by increases in the proportion living 
in small cities.  Increases in the proportion living in metropolitan cities have the opposite effect, 
possibly because those with high levels of education are concentrated in large cities and so the 
education variable captures the effect of residence in large cities.31   
 
 
7.   Discussion  
South Korea is a trendsetter in Asia in terms of development, and now also in reversing the trend 
of rising child sex ratios (Figure 1). We have sought to analyze this case to understand how son 
preference is affected by development, and to throw light on the prospects for achieving more 
equitable child sex ratios elsewhere in Asia.  
 
We discussed the cultural roots of son preference, and how they are affected by development. In 
Korea, Confucian administrators constructed an authoritarian society based on a rigid system of 
corporate patrilineages subservient to the king. Corporate loyalty was underpinned by ancestor 
worship rituals, with the threat of supernatural sanctions if people did not carry out their filial 
duties — of which the primary one was to bear sons to assure the continuity of the corporate 
group. Lineage membership passed strictly through the male line, and determined much of an 
individual’s access to economic opportunities and social status. Women were thoroughly 
marginalized in this system.   
 
This pre-industrial social organization disintegrated in the face of industrialization and 
urbanization. Avenues opened up for obtaining livelihoods and social status which were 
independent of lineage membership and adherence to familial expectations. The accompanying 
urbanization resulted in people no longer being surrounded by patrilineal kin in their place of 
residence and work. This also opened up a possibility for relationships between parents and their 
children to be driven by affect rather than by rigid rules of gender and birth order. All these 
changes helped undercut the bases for son preference. 
 
Since Korean surveys ask about underlying son preference, we were able to analyze the factors 
associated with its reduction. The trend in underlying son preference was unidirectional in a way 
consistent with modernization — uncomplicated by the sharp changes in actual sex ratios at birth 
caused by animal years or improved access to sex-selective technology.   
 
Our findings highlight the importance of societal as opposed to individual change in the decline 
of son preference. A simple comparison of the responses given by women of the same birth 
cohort when interviewed in 1991 and 2003 shows that the proportion reporting strong son 
preference in each cohort halved over this period. The multivariate analysis shows that the odds 
of a woman stating “must have a son” in 2003 were only a third of their 1991 levels, after 
controlling for a wide range of socio-economic characteristics. A similar decline is evident within 
each socio-economic group. Our decomposition analysis indicates that nearly three-quarters of 
the decline in son preference between 1991 and 2003 is attributable to a secular trend of changes 
in social norms sweeping across the population, and only a quarter is attributable to increases in 
the numbers of people proportions educated and living in urban areas.  
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This suggests that the impact of development worked largely through triggering normative 
change within the society as a whole, rather than just through changes wrought in individuals as 
their socio-economic circumstances changed. This applies not only to overall increases in 
education and urbanization, but also to increases in female education and employment — to the 
extent that these increased women’s economic value, their contribution was largely via their 
impact on social norms, rather than at an individual level. Our results are similar to Lesthaeghe’s 
(1983) conclusions relating fertility trends in Europe to ideational change brought about by 
changing economic conditions and the growth of secular individualism. 
 
The decline in the intensity of son preference began amongst the educated professional urban 
elites, and spread quickly across the rest of the population. This follows the pattern put forward in 
studies of the collective adoption of new ideas: a slow start, initiated by those with the greater 
exposure to new information, and then a snowballing of adoption through the population.32  
Now the most conservative groups, such as rural residents, show the maximum fall in son 
preference.  Interestingly, the demise of traditional beliefs is also reflected in the fact that the sex 
ratio at birth shows less manipulation in response to the animal year: parents are less concerned to 
avoid bearing daughters in inauspicious years. 
Another interesting point that emerges from the Korean case is that these social changes occurred 
despite state policies seeking to bolster the traditional family systems.  Successive authoritarian 
regimes sought through their laws and public policies to sustain Confucian traditions, as they 
offered a way of maintaining political stability and pursuing a developmental agenda which 
subsumed individual interests to those of the nation.  These efforts slowed down the process of 
change, but civil society came increasingly to question the old traditions and to pressure the 
government to change its policies. Civil society was successful in pressuring the authoritarian 
military regimes to give way to democracy, whose gradual establishment was marked by 
mileposts such as the democratic constitution of 1987 and the election in 1993 of the first civilian 
president since 1963  — and to other socio-political agendas such as changing the laws 
upholding the marginalization of women.  The demolition of these laws was completed only in 
2005.  As the Supreme Court said in its landmark ruling on the Family Law:  
“Recognizing only male adults as members of a family clan (lineage) and excluding 
female adults from it has little logic in today’s society….’’ (Supreme Court of Korea 
2005, cited in Kim 2005, parentheses ours). 
The process is far from complete. The sex ratio at birth in South Korea is still very high. There is 
continuing strength in beliefs that one must fulfill one’s filial duty to continue the (male) family 
line. Even in 2003, women continue to report significantly higher son preference — controlling 
for a range of other characteristics — if their husband was the only son of his parents, and 
therefore the only source of male descendants. Reduction in the manifestation of son preference 
has also been slowed down by fertility decline, as evidenced by the increasing efforts of women 
to manipulate the sex ratio of their second and higher births if they have not already borne a son.  
The South Korean case throws interesting light on the role of public policy in reducing gender 
inequalities. On the one hand, its policies of rapid economic development induced a breakdown 
of pre-industrial social structures, and also raised levels of female education and participation in 
the formal labor force. On the other hand, successive authoritarian military regimes maintained 
laws and policies that kept women marginalized in their domestic and public lives, and these were 
amended only recently as the political environment changed. It is possible that without these state 
efforts, the sex ratio at birth would by now be normal, instead of merely at the elevated levels 
prevailing before the advent of sex-selection technology. 
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What light does the South Korean case shed on the likely trajectory of child sex ratios in China 
and India, which continue today to soar? The cultural roots of son preference lie in similar 
kinship systems in South Korea, China, and in the parts of northwestern India where child sex 
ratios are very high (Figure 1).33 In many ways, South Korea is much better placed than China 
and India for a reduction in child sex ratios. It is far ahead of these countries in terms of 
industrialization and urbanization. It also has the advantage of being a small and homogenous 
country, where ideas can diffuse rapidly through the population — in contrast with large and 
complex countries such as China and India.   
Yet there is reason to believe that child sex ratios in China and India may begin to normalize 
before these countries become as highly developed as South Korea. Firstly, there are rapid 
changes even in the rural areas of these countries, which are conducive to reduced son preference. 
The spread of non-farm employment diversifies sources of livelihood, making people more 
independent of familial pressures and traditions, and high levels of circular migration spread 
urban ways of thinking.  
Secondly, public policies in China and India have sought hard to increase gender equity, through 
a wide range of interventions aimed at changing people’s perception that girls are less desirable 
than boys, as well as to bring women firmly into public life. These interventions include, inter 
alia, vigorous media campaigns to change ideas about gender roles and equity; legislation to 
enhance gender equity in the civil code; sponsoring grassroots women’s organizations; and even 
financial incentives to parents to raise daughters.34 This contrasts sharply with South Korea, 
where successive military regimes sought through their public policies to uphold muscular 
authoritarian Confucian traditions and keep women marginalized. These policies were gradually 
reversed only when three decades of military rule came to an end. 
The South Korean case suggests that the Chinese and Indian governments have adopted the right 
approach to reduce son preference, by focusing heavily on interventions that seek to alter societal 
norms and accelerate the process of diffusion of new values ⎯ rather than relying only on 
measures such as increasing female education. It is notable that in China and India, public 
policies have sought to lead changes in social norms, whereas in South Korea public policies 
sought to prevent changes in social norms. Without these countervailing public policies, son 
preference may have declined in South Korea before it reached such high levels of development. 
This offers hope that in China and India, public policies will accelerate the process of change 
such that son preference may decline before they reach South Korea’s levels of development.   
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Figure 1.  Juvenile (0-4 year) sex ratios in China, Republic of Korea, India, 
and Northwest India, 1950-2000
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Source:  Official national censuses for each country.   
 
Notes:  The numbers above the bars indicate the actual year that the census was taken.   
The data for India are for the age-group 0-6.  
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Figure 2.  Trends in the sex ratio at birth and the total fertility rate, S.Korea 1970-2005  
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Figure 3.  Trend in the intensity of son preference (percent of women reporting 
“must have a son”), 1985-2003    
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Source:  Korean National Fertility and Family Health Surveys, various years. 
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 Table 1.  Changes in levels of education and urbanization, South Korea 1975-2000  
 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
Women’s education*       
Elementary school or less 77.1 67.0 54.1 43.0 35.0 30.4
Jr high school  completed 12.1 16.5 20.5 20.3 17.1 14.3
Sr high school completed 8.4 12.9 20.2 28.4 34.8 37.3
College completed or more 2.4 3.6 5.2 8.3 13.1 18.0
Men’s education*   
Elementary school or less 53.1 42.8 31.9 23.3 17.8 15.1
Jr high school  completed 17.7 19.8 20.5 17.6 14.2 12.3
Sr high school completed 19.7 25.4 32.1 38.9 41.4 41.6
College completed or more 9.5 12.0 15.5 20.1 26.6 31.0
Other development indicators   
% living in urban areas 50.9 68.7 74.3 81.9 86.7 88.4
%GDP from agriculture, fishery and forestry  27.1 16.2 13.5 8.9 6.3 4.9
Female Labor force participation rate (%)  - 42.8 41.9 47.0 48.4 48.8
Note: * This shows the highest level of education completed by women / men aged 25 or above. 
Source: Korea National Statistical Office, 2006 
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 Table 2.  Percent of women stating “must have a son”, by birth cohort. 
 1991 2003 
Birth year N % N %
1955-64 3416 35.04 2934 19.26 
1965-74 627 27.11 2761 13.11 
Source: Korean National Fertility and Family Health Surveys 1991, 2003. 
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 Table 3.  Differences in family-building behavior by stated intensity of son preference, 
2003 
Women stating 
“Must have a 
son” 
All other 
women All women 
 
 N 
 Sex 
ratio at 
birth 
N 
 Sex 
ratio at 
birth 
N 
Sex 
ratio at 
birth 
2nd birth and above   
At least one previous birth was a boy 414 104.95 1838 113.97 2252 112.25
All previous births were girls 450 194.12 2149 118.39 2599 128.58
Total 864 142.38 3987 116.33 4851 120.70
Note: N indicates the number of births from which these sex ratios at birth are derived.  The births are 
derived from the fertility histories, so all the births of the women in the sample are included here.  The 
woman’s reported intensity of son preference is taken from a single question in the survey.   
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Table 4. Association of women’s characteristics with the intensity of son preference, ever-married 
women aged 15-49 (Multivariate logistic regression analyses, DV=1 if the woman stated 
“must have a son”) 
Variable description Women in 1991 Women in 2003 Women in 1991 and 2003 (Pooled) 
 Odds Ratio P  value 
Odds 
Ratio P  value 
Odds 
Ratio P  value 
Woman’s education       
Jr high school completion or less     1.00  1.00  1.00  
More than Jr high school 0.73 0.000 0.62 0.000 0.55 0.000 
Sr. high school completion or more 0.73 0.017 0.49 0.000 0.47 0.000 
Husband's education       
Jr high school completion or less     1.00  1.00  1.00  
More than Jr high school 0.88 0.082 0.99 0.914 0.86 0.009 
Sr. high school completion or more 0.80 0.039 1.05 0.757 0.89 0.165 
Woman’s occupation       
No job 1.00  1.00  1.00  
White collar job 0.69 0.025 1.08 0.539 0.88 0.192 
Blue collar job 1.03 0.605 1.13 0.134 1.12 0.018 
Husband’s occupation       
No job 1.00  1.00  1.00  
White collar job 1.30 0.142 1.20 0.337 1.19 0.165 
Blue collar job 1.24 0.216 1.28 0.154 1.12 0.327 
Residence       
Rural area  1.00  1.00  1.00  
Small city 0.52 0.000 0.83 0.069 0.60 0.000 
Metropolis 0.33 0.000 0.67 0.000 0.43 0.000 
Year of woman’s birth       
(1991 survey) (2003 survey)       
< 1949 < 1960 1.00 1.00     
1950-1954 1960-1964 0.55 0.75 0.002 0.000   
1955-1959 1965-1969 0.49 0.67 0.000 0.000   
1960+ 1970+ 0.32 0.72 0.002 0.000   
Woman’s age at marriage       
 < 20 1.00  1.00  1.00  
20-21 0.88 0.169 1.22 0.147 0.99 0.855 
22-23 0.85 0.075 1.01 0.923 0.91 0.206 
24-25 0.78 0.011 1.08 0.594 0.90 0.142 
26+ 0.62 0.000 0.78 0.075 0.68 0.000 
Husband is the only son       
No  1.00  1.00  1.00  
Yes 1.35 0.024 1.65 0.000 1.62 0.000 
Living with parent(s)       
Not living together 1.00  1.00  1.00  
Living together 1.32 0.000 1.03 0.795 1.15 0.015 
Year of survey        
1991     1.00  
2003     0.34 0.000 
       
Constant 1.21 0.000 -1.05 0.000 0.53 0.000 
       
Log L -4214.91 -2816.63 -7175.76 
% Concordant  70.1 63.4 72.5 
Sample size 6905 6482 13387 
Note: All p values are based on the Wald test statistic. 
Source: 1991 and 2003 Korea National Fertility and Family Health Surveys 
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Table 5.  Changes in the probability of stating “must have a son” 1991-2003, ever-married 
women aged 15-49 (Univariate logistic regression analyses) 
      Variable  N Odds Ratio P value 
Woman’s education    
Jr high school completion or less     
           1991 3350 1.00  
          2003 1416 0.33 0.000 
More than Jr high school completion         
           1991 2894 1.00  
          2003 3303 0.38 0.000 
More than Sr high school completion        
           1991 698 1.00  
          2003 1803 0.36 0.000 
Husband’s education    
Jr high school completion or less        
           1991 2188 1.00  
          2003 1100 0.28 0.000 
More than Jr high school completion     
           1991 3082 1.00  
          2003 2766 0.33 0.000 
More than Sr high school completion     
           1991 1666 1.00  
          2003 2656 0.35 0.000 
Couple’s residence    
  Rural area     
           1991 1715 1.00  
          2003 828 0.18 0.000 
  Small city     
           1991 1817 1.00  
          2003 2889 0.31 0.000 
  Metropolis     
           1991 3416 1.00  
          2003 2812 0.35 0.000 
Note: All p values are based on the Wald test statistic. 
Source: 1991 and 2003 Korea National Fertility and Family Health Surveys 
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 Table 6. Decomposition of the relative contribution of changes in population composition, and 
changes in social norms within given population groups, to the overall 1991-2003 decline in 
the probability of stating “must have a son”  
 Population composition Social norms 
 Estimate s.e. z value Estimate s.e. z value 
0.0673 0.1829  Total decomposition (26.90) (73.10)  
Detailed decomposition  
Woman’s education (19.00) (3.52)  
0.0134 0.0014 9.49 0.0015 0.0120 0.13 More than Jr high school 
completion (5.35) (0.62)  
0.0342 0.0046 7.44 0.0073 0.0114 0.64 Sr high school completion 
or more (13.65) (2.90)  
Husband's education (2.49) (-7.67)  
-0.0010 0.0003 -3.06 -0.0100 0.0104 -0.96 More than Jr high school 
completion (-0.39) (-3.98)  
0.0072 0.0038 1.91 -0.0092 0.0145 -0.63 Sr high school completion 
or more (2.88) (-3.69)  
Couple’s residence (5.41) (-36.39)  
0.0284 0.0029 9.88 -0.0399 0.0124 -3.21  Small city (11.35) (-15.96)  
-0.0149 0.0008 -17.94 -0.0511 0.0105 -4.85  Metropolis (-5.94) (-20.43)  
0.2844 0.0086 32.89 Constant (113.65)  
Notes  
1) The observed gap in son preference and the gap in the mean of the predicted probability between 1991 
and 2003 are 0.25 and 0.25, respectively. 
2) s.e. denotes standard error. 
3) The numbers in parentheses denote the percentage contributions to the gap in the mean of the predicted 
probability. 
4) Positive (negative) estimates represent positive (negative) effects on the reduction in son preference. 
5) Estimates having z values more than 1.96 are statistically significant at 5% significance level.   
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Appendix:  Methodology used for decomposition 
 
In order to decompose the main factors underlying the decline in the probability of stating “must 
have a son” (intensity of son preference), we used the econometric method extended from 
original models within regression analyses suggested by Oaxaca and Blinder (Blinder, 1973; 
Oaxaca, 1973) to models of discrete choice with a binary dependent variable (Borooah & Iyer, 
2005; Gomulka & Stern, 1990; Nielsen, 1998). Powers (2006) recently developed a supplicated 
method to overcome “a path dependence” problem that in nonlinear models, the independent 
contribution of one variable to the difference depends on the values of the other variables and on 
the order in which these variables are entered the decomposition. Applying his method, to the 
difference in the probability of stating “must have a son” between the respondents in the 1991 and 
2003 surveys, we separated the contributions due to changes in “population composition” 
(differences in measured characteristics between cohorts) from contributions due to changes in 
social norms (differences in coefficients, or differences in the effects of those characteristics 
between cohorts). The econometric method can be explained as follows. 
We have  (indexed, i =1… ) women in mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive 
cohorts, = 1… , each cohort containing  women. We may define the variable  such 
that , if the woman stated “must have a son” and
N N
k K kN iS
1iS = 0iS = , if she did not.  When we use a 
multivariate logistic model, the likelihood (or probability) of a woman, from cohort , stating 
“must have a son” is 
k
ˆexp( ) ˆPr(  =1) ( )ˆ1 exp( )
k k
k ki
i ik k
i
S Fβ ββ= =+
X X
X
, 
where ={kiX ijX , j =1… ) represents the vector of observations, for woman  of cohort , 
on  variables which determine the likelihood of the woman stating “must have a son”, and 
J i k
J
ˆ kβ  = { kjβ , j =1… ) is the associated vector of coefficient estimates for woman belonging to 
cohort k . 
J
The average probability of a woman from cohort  stating “must have a son” is  k
1
1
ˆ ˆ( , ) ( )
kN
k k k k
i k i
i
P N Fβ β−
=
= ∑X X . 
If we consider two cohorts, say women in 1991( k =1991) and women in 2003 ( =2003), the 
difference in observed proportion of women stating “must have a son” between two birth cohorts 
(
k
kS ) is equal to the difference in the average predicted probability from models estimated for the 
two cohorts, or  
1991 2003S S− = 1991 1991 2003 2003ˆ( , ) ( ,i iP Pβ −X X ˆ )β .    (1) 
If we want to decompose the overall difference into components that reflect changes in 
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population composition between cohorts and changes in social norms between 1991 and 2003, we 
can rewrite Eq. (1) as  
1991 2003S S− = { } { }1991 1991 2003 1991 2003 1991 2003 2003ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ( , ) ( , ) ( , ) ( , )i i i iP P P Pβ β β β− + −X X X X . (2) 
The first term appearing in the sum in Eq. (2) is the portion of the differential attributed to 
changes in population composition, which is the predicted probability of stating “must have a 
son” of the 1991 cohort minus the predicted probability of the 2003 cohort if the 2003 cohort 
faced the same social norms (coefficients) as the 1991 cohort. This component reflects the 
contribution to the differences that would have occurred if the two cohorts differed only with 
respect to population composition.  
The second term in Eq. (2) is the portion of the differential attributed to changes in social norms 
(coefficients), which assesses the decline in the intensity of son preference that would have 
occurred if cohort characteristics were held fixed at the levels of the 2003 cohort.35  
Suppose that we have M (indexed, m =1… M ) observed characteristics. To obtain the 
contribution of each independent characteristic to the component of the difference in the women’s 
intensity of son preference, we partitioned the portion of the differential attributed to changes in 
population composition and the portion of the differential due to changes in social norms into 
components that reflect the unique contribution of the th covariate by weighting component. m
The weighting component for the first portion is  
1991 2003 1991
1991 2003 19911
( )
( )
m m m
m
m m
x M
m
x x b
W
x x b
Δ
=
−= −∑ m    
and for the second portion is 
2003 1991 2003
2003 1991 20031
( )
( )
m m m
m
m m m
b M
m
x b b
W
x b b
Δ
=
−= −∑ . 
Here, . 
1 1
1
m m
M M
x bm m
W WΔ Δ= == =∑ ∑
Because the estimates do not provide information about the precision of the contributions to the 
difference in women’s intensity of son preference, we derived standard errors of the detailed 
contributions to each component and conducted significance testing. 
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Endnotes 
                                            
1 See Das Gupta et al (2003, 2004). 
2 This is documented for China in Das Gupta and Li (1999), and for North Korea in Goodkind 
(1999). 
3 See Klasen and Wink (2002) for a discussion of overall sex ratio trends for a large number of 
countries.  
4 For example, Toennies discussed a shift from Gemeinschaft (community) to Gesellschaft 
(purposive association); Maine a shift from status to contract; Durkheim, a shift from 
mechanical to organic solidarity, Weber a shift from behavior motivated by tradition, affect, or 
values to a goal-oriented rationality, and Parsons a shift from ascribed to achieved status. 
5 See for example, McClelland (1961), and Inkeles and Smith (1974).   
6 See for example, Rogers (1962) and Granovetter (1978). 
7 We are grateful to Mari Bhat for pointing out this distinction.  See Das Gupta and Bhat (1997). 
8 For example, more educated women in Punjab showed the largest disparity between the 
mortality rates of second and higher-order daughters, compared with their sons and firstborn 
daughters — being better able than uneducated women to use modern health practices to 
assure child survival, they applied their abilities more assiduously to assuring the survival of 
their wanted children (Das Gupta 1987). As the study pointed out, this did not mean that 
educated women had stronger son preference than others, merely that they were better able to 
implement their preferences.  
9 There is a large literature on the role of ideational change in shaping fertility behavior. See, for 
example, Lesthaeghe (1983) Bongaarts and Watkins (1996), Montgomery and Chung (1999). 
10 See also Janelli and Janelli (1982). 
11 Deuchler (1992:297).  See also Lee (1984), and United States (1990). 
12 As Martina Deuchler (personal communication) points out, the term “clan” is inadequatelyl-
defined in terms of anthropological terminology.  As used in the Korean press and elsewhere, 
it refers to a high level of superordinate lineage, where men are linked by relationships 
stretching several generations into the past.   
13 See Das Gupta et al. (2004). 
14 Moon (2002:489), see also Whang (1981). 
15 Kim 1991, Das Gupta et al (2004). 
16 Lee (2001), Koo (2002). 
17 Private pensions cover a very small percentage of people, even today. The universal social 
pension system started in 1999, but only a small number of people receive it and the sums are 
small. 
18 We are grateful to Minja-Kin Choe for drawing our attention to this. 
19 Prendergast (2005) discusses how daughters offer gifts and physical help to their parents, and 
thereby maintain a bond of mutual support even after they are married. He also discusses sons’ 
and daughters’ changing roles in caring for their old parents.  
20 See Das Gupta et al. (2004). 
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21 Field interviews conducted by Bae Hwa-Ok and Monica Das Gupta in 1996, see Das Gupta et 
al (2003).  
22 See for example, Cho (2002), Koo (2002), and Moon (2002). 
23 Kim and Song (2005) show the correlation between Buddhism and son preference. Park and 
Cho (1995) show that son preference is highest in the Eastern region, where Buddhists are 
concentrated. For a discussion of the relationship between son preference, religion, and 
induced abortion in South Korea, see Chung (forthcoming). 
24 Insook Park and Leejay Cho (1995), United States (2005); Kim and Song (2005).  In the 1991 
Fertility and Family Health Survey, Buddhists and Christians each constituted about 30 
percent of the population, those with “no religion 39 percent, and the remainder including 
Confucians less than 1 percent.   
25 Kim and Song (2005), Park and Cho (1995). For a fascinating anthropological account of how 
Confucianism permeated Korean society, see Walraven (1999). 
26 See for example, Cho (1998), Insook Park and Leejay Cho (1995), Kim (2004), Kim and Song 
(2005), and United States (2005).   
27 Powers (2006) noted that the constant term represents a shift (i.e. a change that cannot be 
attributed to change in model coefficients and model covariates). 
28 The discussion in this paragraph draws on Choe (1987), Choe and Kim (1998), Das Gupta and 
Bhat (1997), Das Gupta et al (2003), and Larsen et al (1998). 
29 See Lee and Paik (2006). 
30 Prendergast (2005) describes how parents can no longer just expect to be cared for by their 
children as a matter of right, but instead need to negotiate a good relationship with them, 
including through offering childcare or financing to buy a house.  
31 We found significant associations among three variables consisting of population composition. 
For example, the gamma statistic between woman’s education and a couple’s residence was 
0.33(p value=0.000) in 1991 and 0.25(p value=0.000) in 2003; and that between woman’s 
education and husband’s education 0.93(p value=0.000) in 1991 and 0.91(p value=0.000) in 
2003. 
32 See for example Rogers (1962), Granovetter (1978) and Montgomery and Chung (1999). For 
an application to demographic trends, see Bongaarts and Watkins (1996). 
33 See Das Gupta et al (1999, 2003, and 2004). 
34 For descriptions of the media campaigns see Naqvi (2006) for India, and Das Gupta et al 
(2004) and Croll (2000) for China and India. For the proposed national financial incentive 
programs in China, see Xinhua (2006), and for India see The Hindu (2006). Various Indian 
states have had incentive programs in place since the early 1990s. Perhaps the most notable 
example is “Apni Beti Apna Dhan” which offers cash to women when they give birth to a girl, 
and sets aside a sum of money to be encashed when the girl turns 18. This was started in 
Haryana state in 1994, and taken up by several other states. A version of this is now under 
consideration for financing by the central government. 
35  By switching the reference cohort by comparison cohort, we obtained an alternative 
decomposition. However, two approaches showed very similar results.   
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